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PREFACE 
n December 2009, hopes were high that the enforcement of the Lisbon 
Treaty would equip the European Union with a more effective and 
democratic political system and transform it into a more unified and 
influential global player. Unfortunately, the EU was deeply mired in the most 
severe financial and economic crisis to have erupted in recent memory, which 
brought it a trio of challenges.  
Firstly, the broad range of reforms in economic governance and 
financial-sector matters created a need for accompanying mechanisms of 
democratic legitimacy. These were not sufficiently provided, however. 
Moreover, cooperation between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments remained elusive. A severe democratic deficit thus emerged. 
Secondly, the crisis also generated new layers of differentiation in the 
Union. The bulk of crisis-driven reforms targeted the common currency area, 
and non-euro area members aspiring to join the euro were not always taken on 
board. Moreover, different appetites for reform were also displayed even 
within the non-euro group of member states. These trends exposed the 
difficulty the EU faces in dealing with heterogeneity. It also called into 
question the cohesion, solidarity and integrity of the Union.  
Thirdly, the crisis also brought to the fore the question of whether we 
have in place adequate institutional structures to deal with the problems of the 
Union and whether inter-institutional cooperation can meet the challenges of 
the day. Difficult concerns about the efficiency of the Union's institutions thus 
emerged.  
The members of the CEPS High-Level Group believed that it was 
essential to address these challenges, particularly in the context of the 
upcoming European elections. A treaty reform might be unavoidable – and 
even advisable – in the future, but we cannot afford to wait for a more 
propitious political climate to arrive.  
With these thoughts in mind, our aim was to pinpoint the main inter-
institutional and intra-institutional weaknesses and put forward specific 
recommendations to shift the EU institutional machinery into high gear. I hope 
that the breadth and depth of the debates are fairly presented in this report and 
sincerely thank all members and the rapporteurs for their valuable 
contributions. 
Danuta Hübner MEP, Chair 
Brussels, March 2014
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP AT A GLANCE 
I. Initiation Phase 
At the beginning of each legislative cycle, the Commission should develop a 
strategic legislative plan for the five years to come, subject to the scrutiny of the 
European Parliament and the Council. The Commissioners’ portfolios should be 
clustered in groups of related policy areas under the leadership of a Vice-President. 
The number of Directorates General should be reduced and the role of the 
Secretariat General should be re-examined. Impact assessments should make better 
use of the consultation process, improve the appraisal of the implementation of the 
proposal and take better account of the Impact Assessments Board’s opinion. The 
composition and rules of procedures of the IAB should be modified to guarantee 
its independence. The Early Warning Mechanism and the Commission’s political 
dialogue with the national parliaments should be enhanced.  
II. Negotiation and Adoption Phase   
The adoption of inter-governmental treaties outside the EU legal framework 
should be confined to exceptional circumstances. The community method and the 
active role of the EP in EU decision-making should be assured whenever it is 
legally possible. All means of differentiated integration should preserve the rights 
and interests of those member states that might join in the future. The EP’s 
committees should be aligned with the Commission’s clustered portfolios, in-
house expertise should be upgraded and bureaucratic rules governing inter-
committee relations should be cut back. Coordination between the Council with 
the EP should be improved and measures should be taken to enhance the profile of 
the rotating Presidencies, e.g. reinforcing the role and visibility of the General 
Affairs Council. Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Council, both at national 
and EU level, should be improved. The instruments of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments should be strengthened.  
III. Implementation Phase 
The EP standing committees should follow up how the relevant DGs in the 
Commission monitor the transposition and enforcement of EU legislation in 
member states. The Commission, the EP and the Council should agree on a clearer 
dividing line between implementing and delegated acts.  The role of the EP in the 
European Semester should be reinforced by a better use of the economic dialogues. 
The Commission could also agree to take the EP’s views on draft recommendations 
into account. It is also essential that the national parliaments are properly engaged 
in the scrutiny of the European Semester to guarantee the fullest possible 
legitimacy of the process. If the European Council finally decides to conclude 
arrangements of a contractual nature with individual member states, the EP should 
be entitled to authorise the budget appropriations and the agreements should be 
put to a vote in the national parliaments. The EP’s oversight of the Banking Union 
should be enhanced.  
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INTRODUCTION 
arely four years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there 
are growing concerns about the unity, efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy of the EU political system. The implementation of the 
treaty provisions reforming the institutions and the decision-making 
procedures and, especially, the management of the euro crisis have raised 
new challenges and re-opened questions that the Lisbon Treaty was 
supposed to have answered. Differentiated integration through either 
enhanced cooperation or international agreements outside the EU legal 
framework, the salient role of the European Council in the EU decision-
making process and the shift of implementing and supervisory powers 
from the national to the EU level in the fiscal and financial domains, have 
all affected the very fundamentals of the EU, its institutional balance and 
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the gap between the citizens and the EU 
seems to be widening. Voter turnout in the elections to the European 
Parliament hit an historic low of 43% in 2009 and citizens’ support for the 
EU and trust in its institutions have declined ever since.  
In the future, a revision of the treaties to address some of these 
concerns might be inescapable, but today’s political climate is not 
favourable. Nevertheless, once the next European Parliament and 
European Commission take office, the EU should undertake a number of 
institutional changes within the confines of the current treaties to improve 
the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions and protect 
its integrity.  
This report aims to identify the main inter- and intra-institutional 
weaknesses in the EU decision-making process and to propose concrete 
recommendations to improve the organisation and functioning of the EU 
that would not necessitate a reform of the treaties. The analysis is based on 
three operating principles, namely, efficiency, democratic legitimacy and 
flexibility. Efficiency is understood as the capacity to deliver results in a 
reasonable span of time with the optimal use of resources. Democratic 
legitimacy is assessed in terms of participation, political accountability and 
B
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institutional balance. Flexibility concerns the responsiveness of the 
institutional framework to reconcile heterogeneity within the EU.  
The structure of the report follows the main phases of the EU 
decision-making process. Section 1 looks into the initiation phase, section 2 
examines the negotiations and the adoption process and section 3 focuses 
on the implementation stage. Each section analyses the main inter- and 
intra-institutional weaknesses in terms of efficiency, democratic legitimacy 
and flexibility, and identifies specific institutional reforms that, without 
further treaty reform, could contribute to overcome them. The final section 
summarises the main recommendations and conclusions.  
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1. THE INITIATION PHASE 
espite the growing agenda-setting powers of the European Council, 
partly as the result of the institutionalisation of its Presidency and 
the evolution of the euro crisis, the European Commission remains 
the key player in the initiation phase. The European Parliament can ask the 
Commission to propose legislation (Art. 225 TFEU), but in the last 
legislature less than 20 own-initiative legislative reports were adopted. The 
efficient and legitimate exercise of the Commission’s right of initiative is 
closely linked to the organisation of the College of Commissioners, whereas 
the impact assessment process and the control of the subsidiarity principle 
are key elements in streamlining legislation.  
1.1 The College of Commissioners 
The principle of collegiality, which should govern decision-making in the 
Commission (Art. 17.6 TEU), guarantees the equal participation of all the 
Commissioners and the collective responsibility for the decisions taken. As 
a collegiate body, the Commission shall promote the general interest of the 
Union and carry out its functions independently (Arts 17.1 and 17.3 TEU). 
In practice, however, important issues have increasingly been handled by 
the Commission President and the respective Commissioner(s) on a 
selective basis rather than through discussions within the College. Few 
decisions are taken by following the oral procedure (in comparison with 
the written and empowerment procedures) and they are hardly ever put to 
a vote (despite the controversy generated by some of them). Aimed at 
avoiding the shortcomings of a large College, this practice has proved 
counterproductive in terms of collegiality and has favoured a silo approach 
to policy-making. This stands at stark contrast to the demand for a more 
holistic approach to deal with increasing interdependencies between 
policies. The fact that there is one Commissioner per member state also 
fosters the perception that Commissioners may represent the interests of 
their country of origin rather than the EU common interest. However, 
member states and their citizens might benefit from having a 
Commissioner who speaks their language and knows more about each 
particular national context.  
D
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The large number of Directorates (33 DGs and 11 Services) makes 
effective internal coordination more difficult and increases the tendency to 
negotiate dossiers between the President and the respective Commissioner. 
This latter practice might open opportunities for vested interests to capture 
the agenda-setting. The high number of Commissioners and DGs also 
creates a bias in favour of excessive legislation. In the last four years, the 
Barroso II Commission adopted 605 legislative proposals, as well as 
another 2,074 initiatives such as communications, guidelines, reports, 
recommendations, Commission regulations, Green and White Papers. As 
shown in Figure 1, the Commission’s efforts to reduce the volume of 
proposals have produced some effect, but the number remains high. 
Figure 1. Number of the Commission’s initiatives adopted 
 
Source: Data collected from http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-
documents/index_en.htm 
1.2 Impact assessments 
The systematic analysis of economic, social and environmental effects in 
the impact assessment (IA) process should serve the two-fold purpose of 
identifying the best alternative for action and stopping poor or 
disproportionate policy proposals.1 However, by selective or inadequate 
                                                     
1  The impact assessment process was launched by the Commission’s 
communication on Impact Assessment COM(2002) 276 final, as was agreed at the 
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presentation of alternatives, DGs might use IAs to justify the regulatory 
proposals they want to push forward. The Impact Assessment Board (IAB), 
which brings together five permanent and four rotating Director-level 
officers from different DGs, publishes opinions on the IAs produced by the 
different DGs before the internal inter-service consultation takes place. In 
2012, the IAB examined 97 IAs submitted by the Commission’s DGs. It also 
issued 47 opinions on IAs that had been requested to be changed and 
resubmitted. In the report for 2012, the IAB noted that the percentage of 
cases where substantial changes were made by the DGs following the 
requests of the IAB had declined, showing special concern in the case of 
negative opinions.2 Even in the event of a weak endorsement by the IAB, 
the Commission might adopt a legislative proposal without a proper 
justification. In addition, the fact that the members of the IAB are 
Commission officials poses questions about their independence and 
capacity to challenge the DGs’ impact assessments.  
The consultation process is not generally extended to involve the 
relevant stakeholders in the evaluation of policy choices set out in the 
impact assessments, thereby missing out on relevant information and 
insights. Moreover, the results of the consultation process might be simply 
‘attached’ to the IA and not taken into account properly. Additionally, the 
IAs can be compiled on the basis of an earlier version of a proposal and 
may not reflect the changes made by the Commission during the inter-
service consultation.  
In a similar vein, if substantial changes are made to the legislative 
proposal during the negotiations in the Council and the EP, the estimated 
impact of the final legislative act remains unknown, given that neither the 
Council nor the EP provides a systematic analysis of the impact of those 
amendments. The capacity of both institutions to carry out impact 
assessments is very limited. The recently created Directorate for Impact 
Assessment and European Added Value (EAV) in the EP issued, in 2012, 
ten initial appraisals of IAs, one detailed appraisal (at the request of a 
                                                                                                                                       
the inter-institutional agreements and updated guidelines followed in the years 
after.  
2  Impact Assessment Board Report for 2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/ 
impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2012_en_final.pdf). 
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committee) and three reports on EAV.3 The Council does not have a similar 
unit or service, and only a few member states are carrying out IAs in a 
systematic way, although the Commission has encouraged them to provide 
their assessments on the complexity, costs and effectiveness of 
implementing EU legislation. 
1.3 Subsidiarity control 
Compliance with the subsidiarity principle by the EU institutions and the 
control by the national parliaments (Art. 5 TEU and Protocol 2) are essential 
to pre-empt unnecessary legislation and ensure that decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizens. After four years in use, a number of 
shortcomings can be identified in the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) 
established by the Lisbon Treaty to ensure that EU legislation complies 
with the subsidiarity principle.  
Since its creation, the participation of national parliaments in the 
EWM has increased steadily. In 2012, the Commission received a total of 83 
(compared to 64 in 2011 and 34 in 2010) reasoned opinions stating a breach 
of the subsidiarity principle in relation to 34 legislative proposals (out of 
around 160). However, this participation is uneven across national 
parliaments. Some 24 legislative chambers from 19 member states sent at 
least one reasoned opinion. Almost half were submitted by four chambers, 
namely, the Swedish Riksdag (21), the French Sénat (7) and the Dutch 
Eerste Kamer (6) and Tweede Kamer (6).4  
With the exception of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (‘Monti II’), 
all the other legislative proposals received fewer than five opinions. In the 
case of the Monti II proposal, 12 national parliaments issued reasoned 
opinions stating a breach of the subsidiarity principle, which triggered the 
‘yellow card’ procedure for the first time since its establishment by the 
Lisbon Treaty (Art. 7 Protocol No. 2). The Commission decided to 
withdraw the proposal in January 2013. A yellow card was issued again 
                                                     
3 The EAV looks at the potential benefits of future EU action and at the costs of not 
taking any action at EU level. See Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, European Commission, COM (2013) 566 final. 
4  Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, European Commission, 
COM (2013) 566 final, Brussels, 30 July 2013. 
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recently when 14 chambers in 11 member states raised objections to the 
Commission’s proposal for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
However, on this occasion, the Commission expressed its determination to 
go ahead with the proposal through the enhanced cooperation procedure 
(ECP). Article 86 (1) of the TFEU foresees this possibility in the absence of 
unanimity in the Council, but in this case there is also an alleged breach of 
the subsidiarity principle.  
The impact of the contribution of national parliaments is weak. Only 
reasoned opinions that reach the threshold might get some visibility and 
have some effect, despite the fact that the Commission may still decide to 
go ahead with its plans. The Commission is in all cases committed to reply 
to the national parliaments, but it is difficult to know whether and how it 
takes their views into account. A few national parliaments also complain 
that the reply letters are sometimes too general and do not properly 
address the specific objections raised.5 These shortcomings can discourage 
the constructive involvement of many MPs in the process. An additional 
weakness is that there is not a common approach to the subsidiarity 
principle. National parliaments usually make a broad interpretation of the 
concept of subsidiarity and most reasoned opinions fail to justify a 
violation of the subsidiarity principle in a strict legal sense, focusing 
instead on the content of the legislative proposal. Many of the opinions are 
motivated by domestic politics and some aim at protecting the national 
interest rather than responding to the objective to ensure the subsidiarity 
principle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Sixteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices 
Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, COSAC, October 2011. 
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Recommendations on the initiation phase 
1. Promote strategic planning 
It is important that the adoption of new legislation responds to clear 
strategic objectives established in advance. At the beginning of each 
legislative cycle, the Commission should develop a strategic legislative 
plan for the five years to come, subject to the scrutiny of the EP and the 
Council. This would contribute to improving the efficiency, political 
accountability and transparency of the EU legislative process. The EP could 
as well take a more active role in setting priorities by means of a better use 
of legislative own-initiative reports and a longer-term approach regarding 
the legislative agenda. The annual structured dialogue with the 
Commission should be focused on the rolling five-year plan and look 
ahead to pre-legislative reviews. The Commission’s reviews of legislation 
should be carried out in groups of related legislation or make explicit 
reference to any particular interaction with existing legislation that should 
be taken into account. 
2. Re-structure the College of Commissioners 
The reduction of the number of Commissioners is politically unrealistic for 
the time being, especially in the terms of the current treaties. Clustering the 
Commissioners with related portfolios is therefore the best option to 
enhance collegial decision-making and improve the independence, 
efficiency and transparency of the Commission. Around eight clusters (e.g. 
external action, competitiveness, finances and economy) could be created 
bringing together three or four portfolios each under the leadership of a 
Vice-President. Clusters of Commissioners would present their common 
position for the College to decide. Temporary task forces reporting to the 
clusters could be created to deal with specific issues, such as youth 
unemployment or better regulation. The re-organisation of the 
Commission’s portfolios should respond to the strategic plan presented by 
the candidate for Commission President to the EP.  
Internal rules should be changed to give the President more 
flexibility to deploy resources so as to meet the needs of priority projects. 
Commissioners should be given a stronger say on their budget and 
personnel, as well as on the selection of the Directors General. The size of 
the Commissioners’ cabinets should nevertheless be reduced. The 
independence of the College should be further strengthened by 
discouraging the partisan activities of its members.  
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3. Reduce the number of DGs 
The reorganisation of the College of Commissioners around clustered 
portfolios would allow for the reduction of the Directorates General. 
Reducing the number of DGs and re-examining the role of the Secretariat 
General, which at present stands out as the extended arm of the President, 
is essential to improve coordination within the Commission and contribute 
to moving from a silo to a more holistic approach in policy-making. It 
would also make it more difficult for vested interests to capture a specific 
policy. The selection of the Directors General should focus more on their 
managerial skills.  
4. Improve the impact assessment process 
The Commission’s services should be endowed with the necessary 
resources to carry out sound IAs and deal with substantial changes 
proposed by the IAB. Impact assessments should make better use of the 
consultation process, take better account of the challenges and costs in the 
implementation phase and include the evaluation of the interactions 
between new proposals and existing legislation, identifying possible 
overlaps, contradictions and negative effects. The Commission should 
provide an overview of all legislative initiatives (including the review of 
existing legislation) for which it intends to undertake an IA. A reasoned 
justification should be provided when an IA is not performed. For all major 
projects a Strategic Policy Assessment, setting out the policy options under 
consideration and the quantified outcomes that will be evaluated in 
making a final decision, should be published before the final policy choices 
are made. Detailed IA reports should be published earlier and the IAB 
comments should be included with the Executive Summary. If the IAB 
opinion does not provide a clear endorsement, the Commissioner 
responsible should provide a statement setting out the reasons for 
proceeding with the proposal. The composition and the rules of procedure 
of the IAB should be modified to fully guarantee its independence.  
Substantial amendments to a legislative proposal should be 
accompanied by a supplementary IA so as to improve the balance between 
the IAs and the final legislative acts. The Directorate for Impact 
Assessment and European Added Value in the EP should be reinforced. 
Guidelines could be published to promote and harmonise the use of IAs 
across committees. The lead committee could send a warning letter to the 
relevant Commission unit when dealing with poor IAs or legislative 
proposals. The shadow of a ‘non-vote’ could be used in extreme cases. As 
for the Council, it could be made compulsory that its legal service provides 
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an appraisal of the Commission’s IA – together with the legal advice that it 
has to prepare for the working group when discussing a legislative 
proposal for the first time. Member state governments should be 
encouraged to carry out their own impact assessments and share 
information among themselves.  
5. Enhance the engagement of the national parliaments 
In the EU, democratic legitimisation takes place at both the European and 
national level. It is therefore imperative to ensure the adequate engagement 
of the national parliaments. A common interpretation of the subsidiarity 
principle should be promoted. The principle of subsidiarity should focus 
more strongly on the real added value that the EU can provide on 
addressing a particular problem. The EWM should be enhanced in such a 
way that it becomes an effective tool for the national parliaments to control 
the subsidiarity principle and an incentive for their earlier engagement in 
EU policy-making. The participation in the EWM and the draft of the 
reasoned opinions across national parliaments should respond to a more 
homogeneous approach. The Commission should provide a better follow-
up of how their views are taken into account.  
A strategic approach to legislative planning and legislative reviews 
would facilitate the involvement of national parliaments and allow them to 
focus on (and not neglect) their priority files. Hearings of Commissioners 
in plenary or committee sessions in national parliaments could contribute 
to a better understanding of MPs about the Commission’s annual work 
programme and the legislative road maps. All this would promote the 
parliamentary scrutiny of the national governments in relation to the most 
relevant proposals and, as part of a more genuine political dialogue with 
the Commission, would change the negative connotation that their current 
participation has in the EU decision-making process.  
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2. THE NEGOTIATION AND ADOPTION 
PHASE 
he use of the co-decision procedure has increased over time, 
becoming the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) under the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EP has therefore acquired a central role in the legislative 
process. To ensure the delivery of results, informal tripartite negotiations 
between the EP, the Council and the Commission have increased. Most of 
the agreements are indeed adopted at first reading. The negotiation phase 
is also shaped by the growing salience of the European Council in EU 
decision-making and increasing differentiation. 
2.1 The EP and the Council in the legislative process 
The Lisbon Treaty extended the use of the renamed ordinary legislative 
procedure (OLP) to cover up to 83 policy areas and limited the use of 
special legislative procedures. As Figure 2 shows, the ordinary legislative 
procedures outnumber by far the other procedures. Council acts that only 
require the consultation of the EP are confined to the regulation of social 
security and social protection, own resources, taxation, fiscal provisions in 
environment and energy and a few issues within the domain of Justice and 
Home Affairs.6 Special procedures that require the consent of the EP are 
used for measures to combat discrimination, the extension of citizenship-
related rights, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the uniform 
electoral procedure and the multi-annual financial framework. The Lisbon 
Treaty also reinforced the role of the EP in the budgetary procedure, where 
the Council is obliged to go to conciliation with the EP, if the latter does not 
agree on the Commission’s proposal as amended by the Council in the first 
reading. As a result of the EP’s stronger role in the legislative process, 
informal negotiations with the Council have been intensified and new 
inter- and intra-institutional challenges have emerged.  
                                                     
6 Such as measures concerning passports, identity cards and residence permits, 
family law with cross-borders implications and operational police cooperation. 
T
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Figure 2. The use of co-decision, consultation and consent procedures 
(% of the total legislative procedures, excluding cooperation) 
 
Note: COD = co-decision, CNS =  consultation and APP (old AVC) = 
consent procedures. 
Source: Data collected from the EP’s Legislative Observatory. 
In order to manage the workload and facilitate the negotiations, the 
decision-making between the Council and the Parliament in the OLP has 
been increasingly centred around informal trilogues and there has been a 
rise of agreements at first reading. The first reading in the EP only requires 
a simple majority of the votes cast and the Council can approve the EP’s 
amendments by a qualified majority. Therefore, it is clearly in the interest 
of the EP to reach early agreements. Amendments to the Council’s 
Common Position in the second reading require the absolute majority of 
the component members of the EP and the later endorsement of the 
Council – by qualified majority if they have the Commission’s positive 
opinion or unanimity otherwise. While many Presidencies actively 
encourage first-reading agreements, it is clear that the Council has more 
control over the outcome by taking the procedure to a second reading. 
After all, the Common Position will then become the proposal to be 
negotiated, and its approval without amendments only requires a simple 
majority in the EP. The use of the Conciliation (third reading) in the event 
of a stalemate at second reading has become near obsolete (except for the 
special budget procedures).  
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Figure 3. 1st readings, 2nd readings and 3rd readings in the OLP  
(% of the total of Ordinary Legislative Procedures) 
 
Source: Data collected from the EP’s Legislative Observatory. 
Trilogue meetings may vary from very technical discussions 
(involving staff of the three main administrations) to very political 
discussions (involving Ministers and Commissioners). However, as a 
general rule, they involve the committee chair – who usually chairs the 
negotiations – and the rapporteur from the EP (often accompanied by 
shadow rapporteurs from other political groups), the chair of COREPER or 
the relevant Council working party assisted by the General Secretariat of 
the Council, and representatives of the Commission (usually the expert in 
charge of the dossier and his/her direct superior assisted by the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General and Legal Service). Despite the fact that 
trilogue negotiations facilitate early agreements and make the process more 
efficient overall, a number of shortcomings can still be identified.  
The legal services of the three institutions sometimes fail to provide 
consistent legal opinions, which complicates and might even stall the 
negotiations. In the EP, delays in the first reading are usually caused by 
difficulties to identify the lead committee, a trend that has grown as the 
result of the increasingly holistic nature of policy proposals. In the event of 
discrepancies, the process to identify the lead committee (and thus 
associated and joint committees), involving the Conference of Committee 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
5th EP
(1999‐2004)
6th EP
(2004‐09)
7th EP
(2009‐14)
1st reading
2nd reading
3rd reading
14 | THE NEGOTIATION AND ADOPTION PHASE 
Chairs and the Conference of Presidents, might take over ten weeks.7 
Additionally, a high number of opinion-giving Committees creates a heavy 
burden and may add unnecessary delays. In-house expertise on highly 
complex issues is not plentiful and is allocated asymmetrically across 
members and committees, which might also undermine the EP’s 
negotiating position.  
The Council often takes a long time to agree on a common approach 
and representatives of the member states are sometimes adamant to secure 
exceptions, at the expense of the clarity and the quality of the piece of 
legislation. Coordination with the previous rotating Presidency of the 
Council is usually good but insufficient between members of the same trio 
of presidencies, whose relations remain confined to the elaboration of the 
joint programme at the beginning of the 18-month period. Stronger 
coordination would add consistency and contribute to strategic law-
making. There is also a minor use of each other’s human resources to plug 
gaps on specific dossiers – as suggested by the Lisbon Treaty, which could 
be quite useful for some small member states. In general, the profile of the 
rotating Presidency of the Council has waned due to the diminished role of 
the Ministers.  
In terms of democratic legitimacy, a growing presence of lobbyists in 
the EP’s activities adds up to the strong influence that some interest groups 
already exert in the capitals. Given the enhanced role of the EP in the 
legislative process, large firms have increased the resources they devote to 
lobbying MEPs. Their investments in such activities are approximating the 
amounts they spend in lobbying the Commission. MEPs need experts’ 
inputs to build up their positions and draft the amendments and, thus, they 
have regular contacts with interest groups.8  
2.2 The growing salience of the European Council 
The number and scope of the meetings of the European Council have 
increased over the years. In the past, there were around three summits per 
year, focused on discussing major issues on EU integration. Nowadays, the 
European Council meets seven times or more per year and increasingly 
decides about specific issues and day-to-day business on core policy areas. 
                                                     
7 Rule 188, Rules of Procedure, 7th European Parliament, July 2013. 
8  S. Hix and B. Høyland, The Political System of the European Union, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, pp. 159-185. 
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The Lisbon Treaty contributed to this trend by giving the European Council 
the status of an EU institution, assigning it a full-time president and 
reinforcing its role in establishing the general political direction and 
priorities of the EU.  
The Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties gave the European 
Council a central role in leading and coordinating certain policies – usually 
partly or fully outside the so-called ‘Community method’ – such as the 
economic governance of EMU, the foreign, security and defence policies, 
justice and home affairs and employment and social policy. The European 
Council’s debates in the last decade have mostly revolved around these 
policy areas but have also substantially dealt with other EU policies such as 
environment and energy.9 In domains such as EU economic governance, 
some consider that the European Council interpreted its functions too 
extensively. Others, however, believe it was the only way to overcome the 
constraints that were undermining the management of the euro crisis at 
national level.  
Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty states that the European 
Council shall not exercise legislative functions (Art. 15.1 TEU), the 
Parliament´s negotiating teams are sometimes confronted with statements 
from the Presidency, negotiating on behalf of the Council, that a particular 
issue has already been decided by the European Council. The Presidency is 
left without a margin of manoeuvre, which obstructs the purpose of the 
negotiations to deliver a common understanding between the EP and the 
Council and contributes to overshadowing the rotating Presidency of the 
Council. 
Despite the growing prominence of the European Council in EU 
decision-making, the mechanisms to hold it democratically accountable 
have not been upgraded accordingly. The President of the European 
Council only reports to the EP after the summits, and often to the Enlarged 
Conference of Presidents instead of the Floor. Information received about 
the eurozone summits is quite limited and mainly confined to the report 
sent by the President of the European Council after the meetings. The 
President of the Eurogroup is not accountable to the EP. Parliamentary 
scrutiny of European Council meetings in many member states is also very 
                                                     
9 U. Puetter, “The European Council: The new centre of EU politics”, European 
Policy Analysis, Issue 2013: 16, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 
(SIEPS), Stockholm, October. 
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weak. 10  Moreover, the meetings of the President’s Cabinet with the 
‘sherpas’ – representatives of the heads of government – have become a 
crucial forum in EU decision-making, which does not contribute to the 
transparency of the process and undermines the role of the General Affairs 
Council (GAC).  
2.3 Increasing differentiation 
The proliferation of ‘opt-outs’ from the treaties, enhanced cooperation and 
agreements between some member states outside the EU legal framework 
are raising questions on where the boundaries of differentiated integration 
lie in an organisation based on a unique legal order with common 
institutions and common principles.  
Since 1 January 2014, the euro area comprises 18 member states. With 
the exception of the UK and Denmark, which have opt-outs, the other 
member states (the so-called ‘pre-ins’) are legally bound to join once they 
meet all the criteria.11 Twenty-two of the EU member states and the four 
EFTA countries participate in the Schengen Area. 12  Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus and Romania will eventually join when they meet the criteria, 
whereas Ireland and the UK have opt-outs. These two countries also have 
an opt-out from the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, with the 
possibility to opt in on a case-by-case basis. As a result of the opt-outs, the 
EU is becoming not only multi-speed but also multi-layered, that is, with 
‘ins’, ‘pre-ins’ and ‘the others’. In relation to eurozone matters, there is also 
the risk of a ‘two-tier Europe’, that is, the development of a different 
institutional setting to decide on issues that only affect the euro members. 
Apart from the existing Eurogroup and Euro summits, ideas have been 
floated to create a special committee in the EP or a Euro-chamber with 
members of national parliaments. Non-eurozone members, and specially 
the pre-ins, are concerned about these developments. The gap between 
                                                     
10 C. Hefftler, V. Kreilinger, O. Rozenberg and W. Wessels, “National Parliaments: 
Their emerging control over the European Council”, Notre Europe Policy Paper 89, 
Notre Europe, Paris, 29 March 2013. 
11 Sweden is not joining the ERM II in order to avoid compliance with one of the 
conditions (exchange rate stability) and thus the introduction of the euro. Monaco, 
San Marino and the Vatican also use the euro on the basis of formal agreements 
with the EU, whereas Andorra, Kosovo and Montenegro do it de facto. 
12 Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican can be considered as de facto members. 
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members and non-members of the eurozone is likely to grow when the 
Lisbon voting provisions enter into force in November 2014, given that 
euro members will constitute a qualified majority in the Council.  
The Council can adopt a decision authorising enhanced cooperation 
between at least nine member states as “a last resort, when it has 
established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole”. 13  Two Council 
regulations implementing enhanced cooperation have been adopted so far. 
One regulation, which entered into force in 2012 for the 14 participating 
member states, concerns the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation.14 The other, adopted by 25 member states, addresses unitary 
patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
and will be applicable after the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court is 
ratified by at least 13 states.15 After receiving the consent of the EP, the 
Council adopted a decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
financial transaction tax (FTT), but the implementing regulation has not yet 
been adopted.16 The growing use of the enhanced cooperation procedure 
(ECP) has raised questions about what should be considered a ‘reasonable 
period’ when trying to reach an agreement that includes all member states, 
and whether nine member states will constitute a critical mass in a Union 
with more than 30 members. Also, the authorisation to proceed with 
enhanced cooperation must be granted by a qualified majority in the 
Council, but the regulations implementing the enhanced cooperation are 
adopted only by the participating members. According to the Treaty, the 
other member states may participate in the deliberations, their rights and 
obligations should be respected and the cooperation should be kept open, 
but this might be interpreted in various ways.  
                                                     
13  Art. 20 TEU; Arts 326-334 TFEU. The Treaty of Lisbon also included the 
possibility for member states to create Permanent Structured Cooperation in the 
area of security and defence (Arts 42.6, 43.1 and 46 TEU). 
14 The provisions will apply to Lithuania as from 22 May 2014. 
15 Spain and Italy did not sign up and brought actions before the Court of Justice of 
the EU against the Council’s authorisation to proceed with the enhanced 
cooperation on the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the 
applicable translation arrangements. Actions were eventually dismissed. Italy 
ratified the Agreement on the Unified Court, whereas Poland adopted the 
Regulation but is now considering not ratifying the Agreement. 
16 The UK has challenged this decision before the CJEU.  
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Figure 4. Differentiated integration in the EU treaties 
 and other inter-governmental treaties 
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As Figure 4 illustrates, the adoption of international treaties outside 
the EU legal framework adds further complexity to the picture and raises 
additional concerns. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) was signed by all the 
members of the EU except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom 
(and Croatia). The Treaty is in force in the 24 states that completed the 
ratification process. 17  Denmark and Romania are bound by the fiscal 
provisions, while these provisions will only apply to the remaining non-
eurozone states when they adopt the euro. All the eurozone members take 
                                                     
17 Belgium has signed but not ratified the treaty. 
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part in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and together with 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and Romania all participate in the 
Euro-Plus Pact. The EP does not participate in the negotiation and adoption 
of these inter-governmental agreements, which are not part of the acquis 
communitaire and therefore are not subject to ECJ’s jurisdiction.  
 
Recommendations on the negotiation and adoption phase 
1. Promote the integrity of the Union and the Community method 
Further integration through international treaties concluded outside the 
EU’s legal framework should be limited to exceptional cases, giving 
priority to the OLP and ECP whenever this is legally possible. Where 
inevitable, the inter-governmental agreements should be open to all EU 
members, involve the EP and set a clear target to be incorporated into EU 
law. All means of differentiated integration should preserve the rights and 
interests of those member states that might join in the future. 
2. Upgrade the organisational structures of the EP 
The EP’s committees should be aligned with the new clusters in the 
Commission. In-house expertise should be enhanced and balanced across 
committees. The Conference of Committee Chairs should be given 
delegated powers to identify the lead committee with exclusive 
competences. Parliament needs to cut back its overly bureaucratic rules for 
inter-committee cooperation and encourage more informal joint working 
methods and hearings. Lobbying rules in the EP should be strengthened. 
Public consultations on specific parts of the legislative dossiers would 
enable input from a wider range of stakeholders. 
3. Improve the role of the Council in the legislative process 
The Council should improve coordination with the EP and devote more 
attention to the clarity of the legislative acts. At later trilogue stages, the 
Presidency should have a clearer mandate from the Council. The 
participation of the chair of the Council’s working parties in the trilogue 
negotiations should not preclude the adequate involvement of the 
Permanent Representatives so as to ensure appropriate political 
accountability. The General Affairs Council should regain the ground lost 
to the Presidency of the European Council and its meetings with the 
sherpas of the heads of government by setting a compelling strategic 
agenda to draw in representatives at Ministerial level. GAC meetings could 
be chaired by the Prime Minister of the country holding the rotating 
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Presidency. Assistance and cooperation between all the members of the trio 
Presidency should be strengthened on the basis of the common programme 
for the 18 months, which should take good account of the strategic 
legislative planning.  
4. Enhance the democratic accountability of the European Council  
The President of the European Council should address the plenary of the 
EP before and after European Council and Euro summits. In the 
framework of the so-called ‘economic dialogues’, the possibility to invite 
the President of the European Council to report and explain its decisions 
on reinforced budgetary surveillance, the coordination of economic 
policies, the excessive deficit procedures and macroeconomic imbalances 
should be promoted.  
5. Reinforce inter-parliamentary cooperation between the EP and the 
national parliaments 
Double legitimisation in the EU requires strengthening cooperation 
between the EP and the national parliaments. The EP can benefit from the 
MPs’ views and expertise, whereas MPs can improve their say in EU 
decision-making and their knowledge and interest in EU affairs, which 
would benefit their scrutiny of national governments and the 
implementation of EU legislation. The Inter-parliamentary Committee 
meetings, organised by a committee of the EP to discuss specific legislative 
proposals with the members of the respective standing committees at 
national level, should be promoted. Financial support should be provided 
at committee and rapporteur level on specific dossiers. The meetings 
should bring together the most appropriate representatives at the right 
time, avoiding large events that make dialogue and debate more difficult. 
They could be conducted by video conference using EP interpretation 
facilities. The EP and the national parliaments could conclude an 
agreement setting the basic features of the antiparliamentary cooperation, 
the rules and reciprocal commitments, as well as specific arrangements to 
promote the relations. Cooperation in the framework of inter-
parliamentary conferences should also be upgraded and measures should 
be taken so as to improve their visibility, influence and attractiveness. In 
particular, the Commission and the Presidency should participate at the 
highest level possible in the recently created Inter-parliamentary 
Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the European Union 
envisaged in the Article 13 of the TSCG, and national parliaments should 
ensure the high profile of their delegations. 
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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
or various reasons, the European Commission plays an essential role 
in the implementation phase. On the one hand, it is responsible for 
the oversight of the application of EU law in member states. On the 
other, the European Parliament and the Council can delegate powers to the 
Commission to supplement, amend or implement legislative acts. In recent 
years, important supervision and implementing powers in the fiscal and 
financial domains have also been transferred from the national to the EU 
level, reinforcing the role of some institutions, such as the Commission, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Council. This section will 
look into the main intra- and inter-institutional challenges posed by all 
these developments.  
3.1 National implementation of EU law 
Despite the Commission’s efforts to improve the oversight of the 
application of EU law, member states often fail to fully comply with their 
responsibilities to transpose, implement and enforce EU legislation. Table 1 
shows the number of letters of formal notice sent by the Commission to 
member states for not communicating the transposition of EU directives in 
their national legal orders in recent years. Although figures depend on the 
number of directives to be transposed every year (e.g. in 2012, there were 
only 56 directives, compared to 131 in 2011 and 111 in 2010), infractions 
remain high on average. In the case of incorrect transposition or wrongful 
application of EU legislation, following an initial assessment of more than 
2,800 complaints in 2012, the Commission opened bilateral discussions with 
the member state concerned in relation to 621 complaints. In 2012, the 
Commission also initiated first bilateral discussions with member states 
from 791 investigations launched on its own initiative. 
 
 
F
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Table 1. Infringements detected in the transposition of EU legislation in member 
states 
Year Letters of 
formal notice 
for "non-
communication" 
Number of 
complaints 
Own-
initiative 
cases 
Total  Open 
infringement 
cases at end 
of year 
2012 445 621 791 1857 1343 
2011 1154 619 1271 3044 1775 
2010 855 244 190 1289 2092 
2009 531 772 356 1659 2892 
2008 816 1038 369 2223 3433 
2007 1196 958 512 2666 3408 
2006 904 1049 565 2518 3255 
2005 1066 1154 433 2653 3567 
2004 1519 1146 328 2993 3655 
Note: In 2011 and 2012, the number of complaints and own-initiative cases refers 
to the initial bilateral discussions undertaken by the Commission with the 
member states before opening an official infringement procedure. In the 
previous years, the number reflects the infringement procedures opened as 
a result of complaints or own-investigations. 
Source: Data collected from Commission’s annual reports on Monitoring the 
Application of EU Law.  
Despite the Commission’s recent initiatives, such as the EU pilot to 
improve the application of EU law, the transposition of EU legislation in 
member states is still deficient. Their support to SOLVIT tools, which 
provides citizens and business with a fast track to find pragmatic solutions 
to problems caused by the breach of EU law by a public authority, is also 
weak. The Commission has also improved the handling and reduced the 
time of the infringement procedures, but this is still long. As Table 2 shows, 
1,343 infringement cases remained open at the end of 2012 (compared to 
1,775 in 2011 and 2,092 in 2010).18 During that year, the Court delivered 46 
                                                     
18 In 128 procedures, the Commission could not yet confirm whether the member 
states concerned had complied with the Court judgments. 
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judgements under Art. 258 TFEU, 42 of which favoured the Commission’s 
position.  
3.2 Implementing and delegated powers 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the old 
comitology was replaced by a new system of delegated and implementing 
powers that a particular legislative act can grant to the Commission so as to 
complement or implement specific provisions of secondary legislation. In 
the case of the delegated acts (Art. 290 TFEU), which aim to supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act, the EP and the 
Council have the right to object to a delegated act adopted by the 
Commission by the deadline specified in the original legislative act (usually 
two months, with a possible extension of two more). Both institutions also 
have the capacity to revoke the delegation at any time. In the preparation of 
the delegated acts, the Commission is committed to consult experts from 
national authorities of all member states (expert meetings) and to send all 
the related information to the Council and the EP. At the request of the EP, 
the Commission might also invite Parliament’s experts to attend the 
meetings. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission 
has adopted 65 delegated acts, and 37 more are awaiting the expiry of the 
objection period.19 These data show that the new system is working well in 
terms of efficiency, especially due to the fact that if no objection is raised 
and no extension is requested by either the Council or the EP, the delegated 
acts enter into force automatically (usually within two months). Since the 
enforcement of the new system, only the EP has raised a few objections, 
which were eventually withdrawn after an exchange of views with the 
Commission.  
The implementing acts (Art. 291 TFEU and Regulation 182/2011) aim 
to ensure the uniform implementation of EU legislation across member 
states. In this case, the Commission’s proposals must be examined by 
committees of national representatives. In the advisory procedure, the 
committee’s opinion is not binding for the Commission, whereas in the 
examination procedure, the Commission cannot adopt the implementing 
act in the event of a negative opinion. However, it can refer the case to the 
appeal committee, consisting of national representatives at a higher level of 
                                                     
19 Register of Commission documents 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=search). 
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representation. In the event of a non-opinion also in the appeal committee, 
the Commission tends to adopt the act in any case. So far this has happened 
in relation to 17 (out of 20) implementing acts.20  Where a basic act is 
adopted under the OLP, either the EP or the Council may at any time 
indicate to the Commission that, in its view, a draft implementing act 
exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the basic act. In such a 
case, the Commission shall review the draft implementing act and inform 
the EP and the Council whether it intends to maintain, amend or withdraw 
it. Since the entry into force of Regulation 182/2011 of 18 February 2011, the 
Commission has adopted over 3,450 implementing acts.21 The new system 
has not suffered in terms of efficiency, given that a similar number of 
comitology decisions were taken on a yearly basis in the past.  
The main weakness in the system introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is 
indeed the thin line dividing delegated and implementing acts. On many 
occasions, either could be applied and EU institutions disagree on which 
one to select. This choice thus becomes the object of negotiation during the 
adoption phase of a legislative act. The delegated acts give a greater leeway 
to the Commission and stronger oversight powers to the EP, whereas the 
member states have an important role to play in the adoption of 
implementing acts. It is therefore usual that the Council questions the 
(many) delegated acts in the Commission’s proposals and pushes to change 
them into implementing acts during the negotiations with the EP, which 
might be tempted to give way in exchange for concessions on the substance 
of the legislative act.  
3.3 Implementation and surveillance of the new fiscal rules 
In the early 1990s, member states of the European Communities decided to 
proceed with the creation of the monetary union without first coordinating 
their fiscal and economic policies. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was 
established as a peer-review mechanism to encourage coordination and 
approximation. The euro crisis has unveiled the flaws of the system and 
obliged member states to reform the SGP and adopt new measures to 
ensure the convergence of the fiscal and economic policies of member 
states, namely the Six- and Two- Packs and the Fiscal Compact.  
                                                     
20 Comitology register (http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/ 
index.cfm?do=List.list&NewSearch=1). 
21 Ibid. 
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Box 1. Fiscal and macroeconomic coordination and surveillance 
The Six-Pack (five regulations and one directive) defined quantitatively a 
significant deviation from the medium-term objective (MTO), introduced 
the ‘macroeconomic imbalance procedure’ (MIP), established financial 
penalties for breaching either the deficit or debt limits under the excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP) and the reverse QMV in the Council for most 
sanctions. It also codified the European Semester to provide a six-month 
timeline to elaborate, discuss and adopt the country-specific 
recommendations on the member states’ Stability or Convergence 
Programmes (fiscal plans) and National Reform Programmes (structural 
reforms and measures to boost growth and jobs).  
The Fiscal Compact (Title III of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance of the EMU  TSCG) established a stricter 
limit for the structural deficit in eurozone member states, included the 
obligation to enshrine the ‘balanced budget rule’ and the ‘debt brake rule’ 
in their constitutional or legal orders, provided an alert mechanism to 
identify member states whose macroeconomic situation needs to be 
scrutinised in more depth and also extended the use of the reverse QMV 
to most sanctions.  
The Two-Pack further enhanced the fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance of all euro-area member states, and especially those under an 
excessive deficit procedure, experiencing (or at a risk of) financial 
instability or participating in a financial assistance programme. 
Regulation 473/2013 established the obligation of euro members to 
submit their draft annual budgetary plans before mid-October for the 
Commission to check (and the Eurogroup to discuss) whether they are in 
line with the SGP and with the recommendations of the European 
Semester, as well as the requirement for countries in an EDP (Economic 
Deficit Procedure) to inform the Commission about relevant fiscal policy 
decisions. The Regulation set up an (alternative) enhanced surveillance 
procedure for member states facing serious financial difficulties and 
receiving financial assistance.  
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The strengthened fiscal and macroeconomic coordination and 
surveillance takes place in the framework of the European Semester. The 
involvement of the EP and the national parliaments in this procedure is 
insufficient.22 Nevertheless, during the negotiations of the Six- and Two-
Packs, the EP succeeded in introducing the so-called ‘economic dialogues’. 
The competent committee of the EP may invite the President of the 
Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the 
European Council or the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the 
committee to discuss decisions adopted in the framework of this 
legislation. National parliaments and the EP can also require the 
Commission to explain its opinions on the draft budgetary plan submitted 
by the government of the concerned eurozone member. In the case of 
countries under enhanced surveillance, the competent committee of the EP 
and the parliament of the member state concerned may invite 
representatives of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF to participate in 
an economic dialogue. 
At the moment, negotiations are being carried out on the terms of the 
‘individual arrangements of a contractual nature with the EU institutions 
on the reforms promoting growth and jobs’.23  The main purpose is to 
establish an incentive-based enforcement of the country-specific 
recommendations when legal sanctions under the corrective arm of the 
MIP cannot be imposed. Compliance will be reassured through the 
selective use of financial assistance, somehow resembling the Memoranda 
of Understanding of the ESM Treaty. In principle, the agreements will be 
adopted by the Council, based on a proposal by the Commission. 
Negotiations seem to indicate that the EP will at least have a role in the 
oversight of their implementation as they will affect the application of the 
EU budget. Given that the arrangements will not be treaties, they might not 
require ratification by some national parliaments. 
In addition to these democratic concerns, the new EU economic 
governance also poses a number of challenges in terms of flexibility. The 
Six-Pack applies to all EU member states, but there are special provisions 
for the euro members. The scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators is 
                                                     
22 Mark Hallerberg, Benedicta Marzinotto and Guntram B. Wolff, “An assessment 
of the European Semester”, EP, DG-Internal Policies, September 2012. 
23  H. Van Rompuy, “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, 
Brussels, 5 December 2012 
 (www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/.../en/.../134069.pdf ). 
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different, there is a discussion in the Eurogroup of the Commission’s 
Annual Report and financial sanctions are only applicable to euro 
members. The Two-Pack applies exclusively to the euro area. The TSCG 
was signed by all EU members except the Czech Republic, the United 
Kingdom and Croatia, although non-euro members with the exception of 
Denmark and Romania are not bound by the fiscal provisions (Title III). 
The TSCG provides for Euro Summit meetings to take place at least twice a 
year to discuss questions regarding the single currency, the governance of 
the euro area and the rules that apply to it, as well as strategic orientations 
for macroeconomic policies. The heads of state or government of non-euro 
members can participate in discussions concerning competitiveness, the 
modification of the global architecture of the euro area and the 
fundamental rules that will apply to it in the future, as well as, when 
appropriate and at least once a year, in discussions on the implementation 
of the TSCG. 
3.4 Bank supervision and resolution powers 
In addition to these measures aimed at improving the control of the EU 
over national fiscal and macroeconomic policies, other initiatives have been 
adopted to facilitate the supervision and resolution of banks and to assist 
member states with financial difficulties. The Treaty establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was signed on 2 February 2012, with 
the mechanism becoming operational in October 2013. The ESM issues debt 
instruments in order to finance loans and other forms of financial assistance 
to euro area member states. The direct recapitalisation of banks is possible 
under certain circumstances. Given that it was an international treaty, the 
EP did not take part in the adoption process. The ESM Board of Governors 
consists of the Ministers for Finance of the eurozone member states and is 
chaired by the President of the Eurogroup. The Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB participate in 
the meetings as observers.  
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which came into force in 
November 2013, set up a supervisory board in the ECB in charge of the 
direct oversight of the European banks in cooperation with the supervisory 
authorities in the member states. Art. 20 of Regulation 1024/2013, 
conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions, provides that the ECB has to 
cooperate with any investigations by the EP and that, upon request, the 
chair of the supervisory board will hold confidential oral discussions with 
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the chair and vice-chair of the competent committee of the EP. The 
approval of this Regulation only required the EP to be consulted, but the 
EP used its powers in the negotiations on the related Regulation 1022/2013 
amending the European Supervisory Authority to force an inter-
institutional agreement with the ECB on the oversight of these supervisory 
tasks. According to the agreement, the chair of the supervisory board has to 
appear once a year before the EP to present the annual report on the 
execution of these tasks and has to participate in two public hearings, as 
well as in additional ad hoc exchanges of views and special confidential 
meetings. The appointment of the chair of the supervisory board requires 
the approval of the EP. The ECB also has to reply in writing to written 
questions put to it by the EP and provide the competent committee with a 
record of the proceedings of the supervisory board, including a list of the 
decisions adopted and those objected to by the Governing Council. In the 
event of the winding-up of a credit institution, non-confidential 
information shall be disclosed ex post.  
Non-euro members can become participating countries in the SSM 
and be represented in the Supervisory Board. However, the Governing 
Council of the ECB, where only eurozone members are represented, has the 
final power to reject or accept the decisions of the Supervisory Board. 
Additionally, pre-ins will only have access to the Balance of Payments 
facility (BoP), which, contrary to the ESM, does not envisage loans for the 
direct recapitalisation of banks.  
Negotiations on an SRM are also on their way. In its meeting of 18 
December 2013, the Ecofin Council agreed on a common approach to the 
single resolution board and committed to negotiate an intergovernmental 
agreement on the single resolution fund (outside the EU legal framework). 
The EP has challenged the decision of the Council to resort again to an 
inter-governmental treaty when the reforms could have proceeded 
following the Commission’s proposal within the Community legal 
framework. The EP has also stated concerns about the vagueness and at the 
same time high complexity of the text. The EP can now issue its co-decision 
power in the regulation to exert some influence in the inter-governmental 
treaty. Pre-ins have also raised concerns about the transitional period until 
the mutualisation of the banks’ paid-in contributions is completed. During 
this time, eurozone members can resort to the ESM when their own 
allocations in combination with possible loans from the other ‘national 
compartments’ prove insufficient. However, pre-ins would be obliged to 
follow a cumbersome procedure through the BoP, which again would not 
allow for breaking the banking-sovereign link.  
SHIFTING EU INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTO HIGH GEAR | 29 
Recommendations on the implementation phase 
1. Improve the implementation of EU law 
The EP standing committees should follow up how the relevant DGs in the 
Commission monitors the transposition and enforcement of EU legislation 
in member states. This would bring additional pressure, both on the 
Commission to continue improving the oversight of the application of EU 
law and on the member states to improve transposition and ensure 
enforcement. A fast-track infringement procedure could be created and 
more information should be provided by the Commission on the quality of 
the transposition.  
By means of an inter-institutional agreement, the Council, the EP and 
the Commission should agree on a clearer dividing line between 
implementing and delegated acts. Members of the competent committees 
in the EP should more often attend the expert groups consulted by the 
Commission in the preparation of the delegated acts.  
2. Reinforce the role of the EP in the European Semester 
The role of the EP in the European Semester should be enhanced through 
the formal arrangement of specific economic dialogues with the 
Commission and the Council. In particular, the Commission should appear 
before the relevant committee of the EP to present the Annual Growth 
Survey and the Alert Mechanism before a new European Semester starts, 
and again in May to explain the draft country-specific recommendations. 
By means of an inter-institutional agreement, the Commission could 
commit itself to take in the views of the EP in its proposals for 
recommendations and decisions to the Council. The President of the 
Council should appear before the EP in early July to discuss the variations 
between the final recommendations endorsed by the European Council 
and adopted by the Council and those originally proposed by the 
Commission. In autumn, the Commission could participate in an exchange 
of views on the implementation of the country-specific recommendations 
by member states. All this would feed into the EP resolution on the 
European Semester cycle in October. Both the Commission and the 
President of the Eurogroup should appear before the competent committee 
of the EP to discuss the opinions on the national draft budgetary plans.  
3. Engage the national parliaments in the scrutiny of the European Semester 
The participation of MPs in the inter-parliamentary European week in 
January/February (or in the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic 
and Financial Governance of the European Union) should enable them to 
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debate the key findings and conclusions from the Annual Growth Survey, 
the Alert Mechanism and other related issues. The member governments 
should then be responsible for informing their respective parliaments on 
the draft national programmes to be submitted to the Commission. Once 
the Commission has examined these drafts and issued the country-specific 
recommendations, these could be communicated to the national parliament 
concerned in the framework of the political dialogue, so that national 
parliaments can question their respective governments before (and after) 
the adoption of the recommendations in the Council. 
The possibility provided in Regulation 473/2013 to request the 
Commission to appear before a national parliament to present its opinion 
on the national draft budgetary plans submitted in October should be 
institutionalised. Then, the national minister could give account of the 
subsequent discussions in the Eurogroup. The Commission and the ECB 
should commit to participate in an economic dialogue with the parliament 
of a member state under enhanced surveillance upon its request. 
4. Underpin the legitimacy of the individual arrangements of a contractual 
nature 
If the European Council finally decides that the individual member states 
should conclude arrangements of a contractual nature in the context of the 
European Semester, the EP should be entitled to authorise the 
appropriations for the funds to compensate them for specific costly 
reforms. The agreements should be put to the vote of the respective 
national parliaments. 
5. Ensure the adequate involvement of the EP in the Banking Union  
The EP should make the best use of the scrutiny mechanisms established in 
the inter-institutional agreement with the ECB to ensure the accountability 
of its new supervisory powers. The new role of the ECB makes necessary a 
stronger oversight by the EP. In the framework of the ‘economic dialogues’, 
the President of the Eurogroup should report to the EP on the ESM, where 
appropriate. The resort to inter-governmental treaties outside the EU legal 
framework for issues that could be regulated following the Community 
method, such as the SRM, should be avoided. The decision-making of the 
resolution board should be simplified and the political accountability 
ensured. The interests of the pre-ins and opt-outs should be properly taken 
into account.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
he promotion of strategic legislative planning, the re-organisation of 
the Commission’s portfolios and the reduction of DGs are essential 
to increase the efficiency, transparency and political accountability in 
the initiation phase. At the beginning of each legislature, the Commission 
should submit a five-year legislative plan to the European Parliament and 
the Council. This strategic legislative plan should focus the annual 
structural dialogue with the EP, which should also promote the use of the 
own-initiative legislative reports. In order to avoid excessive legislation and 
enhance its quality, the impact assessments need to be improved and the 
independence of the Impact Assessment Board must be guaranteed. 
The practice to resort to inter-governmental treaties outside the EU 
legal framework should be restricted and the Community method, 
whenever possible, promoted. The rights and interests of the non-
participating member states, also in the case of the enhanced cooperation 
procedures, should be better protected.  
The European Parliament needs to align its standing committees with 
the re-organised Commission portfolios, enhance in-house expertise and 
cut back its overly bureaucratic rules for inter-committee cooperation. The 
Council should improve coordination with the EP and devote more 
attention to the clarity of the legislation. The profile of the rotating 
Presidency of the Council should be upgraded and cooperation between 
members of the same trio should increase. The EP’s scrutiny of the 
European Council and the Eurogroup needs to be improved.  
It is also necessary to clarify the dividing line between delegated and 
implementing acts by means of an inter-institutional agreement. In the 
particular case of EU economic governance, the role of the EP in the 
European Semester should be enhanced and a number of economic 
dialogues should be institutionalised. The EP should be entitled to 
authorise the appropriations for the financial incentives in the event of 
individual arrangements of a contractual nature. In a similar vein, it is 
essential that the EP plays a role in the oversight of the single supervisory 
and resolution mechanisms. 
T
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The framework agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission should be enhanced and could 
address many of the inter-institutional issues related to the initiation, 
adoption and implementation phases. The inclusion of the Council in the 
agreement is highly recommended.  
A strategic approach to legislative planning and legislative reviews, 
the agreement on a common approach to the subsidiarity principle and the 
participation in the Early Warning Mechanism, a proper report on how the 
national parliaments’ opinions are taken into account and a strengthened 
political dialogue with the Commission, would all contribute to ensuring 
the subsidiarity principle and underpinning EU legitimacy. To facilitate the 
engagement of the national parliaments in EU affairs, it is also essential to 
enhance inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and 
with the EP. This would also carry benefits for EU legislation. In the 
particular case of the new framework for fiscal and macroeconomic 
coordination and surveillance, inter-parliamentary cooperation between 
the EP and the national parliaments and a closer dialogue with the 
Commission are essential to ensure the double democratic legitimacy of the 
system. The individual arrangements of a contractual nature on the reforms 
promoting growth and jobs should be put to a vote in the respective 
national parliaments. 
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